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Philip A Quadrio
Introduction
This paper represents a contribution to a longstanding discussion
between Professor G W Trompf and myself on the nature of Hegelian
philosophy in general. I present it both in the spirit of continued
dialogue with an old friend over a disputed topic and as an indication
of some, admittedly quite abstract, points where his work has
influenced my own. In this paper I address the issue of social and
political organicism, which is a way of approaching social and
political theory by understanding the socio-political realm as
displaying features that could be described as organic, the features of
self-organisation, self-sufficiency and unity. The exact implications
of this understanding of the socio-political realm are disputed. Many
have claimed that it results in a form of social holism and hence is
hostile to the individual and to liberal individualism in general.
Others, though a minority, have understood organicism in different
terms, finding in this theory a way of bridging the gap between liberal
individualism and more holistic or communitarian conceptions of the
social. One of the most important claims of those who take the latter
approach is that social or political organicism is a theory based in
reciprocal and non-dominating relations between agents, both
individual and institutional. Thus the unity that is involved in the
organic conception of the social is a unity of reciprocity. It will be
noted here that, for those who worry about the status of the individual
in the organic conception of the social, the notion of ‘reciprocal non-
dominating relations’ carries a heavy burden. This paper addresses
itself to that burden; it aims to give theoretical form to that unity of
reciprocity.
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If one accepts that Hegel’s social and political theory presents us with
a ‘relational’ rather than a ‘holistic’ organicism,1 then the proper
account of these relations is recognitive. In other words, a relational
conception of social or political organicism can be fulfilled by giving
a recognitive account of those relations. Recognition theory, which
has a recognisably Hegelian heritage, gives deeper theoretical content
to Hegel’s organicism. Further, the intersection of the organic theory
of the social and a recognitive account of relations within the social
provides us with unique theoretical insights into the nature of that
sphere of Geist or Spirit that Hegel calls ‘Objective’ Geist. These
insights can then be applied to the Hegelian conception of Spirit
generally, inviting the conclusion that Hegelian Geist or Spirit has an
‘organic’ structure. When Geist is understood as having such an
structure, the reading of Geist as a superpersonal force, indifferent to
human agency,2 also comes into question. Thus we are led from an
organic social ontology to the phenomenon of recognition and
ultimately towards an organic account of Geist in general. This
constitutes not only a contribution to Hegel studies, but to social
theory and to the philosophy of culture more generally.
This paper focuses predominantly on the nature of relation within
what we call, along with Avital Simhony, ‘relational organicism’. I
will not spend time justifying this reading of Hegel’s references to the
organic in his social and political theory; I defend this reading in
other works and, in that it coheres with the reading of Avital
Simhony, Robert Williams and Sally Sedgwick, it is not particularly
controversial. I offer a more original contribution to understanding
the organic thesis in Hegel, giving a theoretical account of the nature
of the relations that exist within ‘relational’ organicism. This serves
to fulfil theoretically what is a fairly abstract conceptualisation of
Hegel’s approach to the socio-political realm. Before doing so, I must
explain the relational reading of Hegel’s organicism and why it is to
be preferred over a holistic reading. This is not a fulsome account of
                                                           
1 P A Quadrio, Towards a Theory of Organic Relations: Hegel’s Social Theory from
Tubingen to Jena, PhD Dissertation (The University of Sydney, 2006) 15-38.
2 I Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity (London, 1990) 42.
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the relational theory but merely serves to prime the reader for the
subsequent discussion.
On Relational Organicism
I have argued elsewhere that, while Hegel certainly held an organic
conception of the state, and indeed of the social more generally, this
did not, as is commonly thought, imply a commitment to social
holism.3 In a holistic conception of the social, the elements are
reduced to a function of the whole and thus they have no positive
status outside that whole. In regard to the community, this would
imply that members of the community are merely a function of that
community and have no positive status outside of it. Such a thought
horrifies many in the liberal tradition, which has its centre of gravity
in the rights and liberties of the individual. Insofar as the holistic
conception of society sees the individual as a function of society, it
threatens such individual rights and freedoms. Thus in the liberal
anglophone world of the mid-twentieth century, a number of essays
emerged that either implicitly or explicitly attacked the Hegelian
conception of the socio-political realm as holistic and often did so by
reference to Hegel’s organicism. In this regard one might mention the
work of Karl Popper,4 H J McCloskey5 and John Macmurray.6 One of
the most notable figures in this landscape, and an intellectual mentor
to Professor Trompf, was the Oxford historian of ideas, Isaiah
Berlin.7
In general, the critics of organicism have tended to equate the organic
state with holism, a view which then invokes the threat of a
totalitarian cancellation of individual interest. Insofar as the critics
make such an equation, many, like Berlin, have misunderstood the
theory, misread its implications and misunderstood its motivations.
                                                           
3 Quadrio, op cit, 15-38.
4 K R Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies (London, 1966).
5 H J McCloskey, ‘The State as an Organism, as a Person and as an End in Itself’,
The Philosophical Review 72, 1963.
6 J Macmurray, John Macmurray: Selected Philosophical Writings (Exeter, 2004).
7 I Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ in G Sher and B A Brody, eds, Social and
Political Philosophy: Contemporary Readings (Orlando, 1999).
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Elsewhere, I have criticised Berlin’s discussion of the organic
elements to Hegel’s theory, analysing in particular his comments on
the organic conception of society in the essay ‘Two Concepts of
Liberty’,8 against remarks in the collection The Crooked Timber of
Humanity. I shall not rehearse my criticisms of Berlin here. Suffice to
say that, in concluding that Hegel’s references to the organic imply a
holistic understanding of the state or of society generally, Berlin
misunderstands the nature of Hegel’s organicism.9 Against Berlin’s
holistic reading of organicism, I offer a reading of the organic thesis
as a ‘relational theory’.10
In that the organic society is not holistic but rather relational, the
relations between the part (member) and whole (community/state), as
well as between the parts (members) themselves, are caught up in a
dynamic of mutual or reciprocal dependence. No member by itself
can function autonomously. Organic relations are, to borrow a phrase
from Sally Sedgwick, those of ‘reciprocal determination’,11 in that
each element influences each other and no term in the relation has
priority. Every element is reciprocally determining and determined;
the elements are mutually penetrating. Similarly, between the whole
and the part, each is both determined and determining; they are
mutually penetrating. It is not the case that the individual is a function
of the whole, since the whole is seen as constituted by the specific
attitudes, beliefs and actions of the elements, while the elements are
the elements that they are because the whole itself constitutes a
framework in which such attitudes, beliefs and actions can form and
against which they make sense. The integrity of this specific unity
requires that every aspect of it is essential, nothing is inessential, and
each contributes to and is contributed to by each other. Within this
kind of unity, no act by any agent, be it individual or institutional, can
be considered to be isolated or insulated from other acts and other
agents. There is no ontological priority. This organic unity offers an
                                                           
8 Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, op cit, 624-35.
9 Quadrio, op cit, 15-25.
10 Quadrio, op cit, 25-38.
11 S Sedgwick, ‘The State as Organism: The Metaphysical Basis of Hegel’s
Philosophy of Right’, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (Supplement), 2000,
183.
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alternative to individualism and holism. To borrow from Williams, as
a conception of society, it is an alternative to a nominalistic pluralism
on the one hand and a totalitarian monism12 on the other, because its
moments do not lie in opposition13 but are bound by reciprocity.14
Insofar as critics like Berlin see Hegelian organicism as a form of
totalitarian monism wherein the whole has priority, they
misunderstand that approach to the social. In particular they miss the
deep reciprocity in the relations, not only between elements but also
between the elements and the whole. (I add, as it will be important
later in this essay, that, insofar as critics see Geist as a totalising
monism having ontological priority over its manifestations or
elements, they misunderstand Geist. They miss, in particular, the
deep reciprocity and dynamism that is vital to Geist.)
For Hegel, one of the essential features of this way of understanding
the social is that society, or the whole, can be seen simultaneously as
the product of the activity of the individuals who comprise it and as
something that has contributed to their own formation qua
individuals. The society and the individuals in it are mutually
constituting. Society or the whole is not some alien ‘thing’ that sits
over and above the individual but is rather a product of the collective
activity of the individuals in it. It is a mode of collective self-
understanding, a way of relating to ourselves as part of a collective
enterprise. It is how ‘we’ have come to organise ‘our’ common life.
The whole thus provides a vehicle for a form of universal self-
consciousness, facilitating a collective self-understanding, a way of
relating to ourselves as a collective while not reducing our self-
understanding to a mere function of that collective.
This notion of universal self-relation will be disambiguated later in
this paper. For the moment, we can say that, in the organic theory, the
kind of universal self-relation or self-consciousness that is constituted
                                                           
12 R R Williams, Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition (Berkeley, 1997) 295.
13 The language of opposition being the language of the logic of essence in Hegel’s
later work.
14 The language of reciprocity being the language of the logic of the concept in
Hegel’s later work.
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by a community – its capacity to think of itself or to refer to itself as a
community – is bound up in reciprocal or dynamic relations. This
mode of self-relation is non-static and changes with the changing
social relations of that community; it is a mode of self-relation that is
in movement. In that the part (member) is informed by the whole
(community), the part (member) is transformed by the whole
(community). But insofar as this is so, so too the whole (community)
of which it is a part is transformed to a greater or lesser extent. This is
the principle of reciprocity acting in the social realm. The universal
self-consciousness or the ‘we’ of the organic society interpenetrates
all members and all institutions; one cannot think of oneself as
external to others or to institutions. It is due to this interpenetration
that ‘we’ see this society, community or state as ‘ours’, something in
which ‘we’ have a collective stake and which has a stake in us. The
society, community or state is ‘ours’ in the way that the family is
‘ours’: not in the sense that it is the kind of thing that we possess, but
in the sense that we are co-constituting members of it, so that, if any
member were lost or even ‘replaced’, the family itself would undergo
transformation. The family is not a material possession like the
family home; it is ‘ours’ in the sense that we can rationally affirm it
and see ourselves in it. It is ‘ours’ in the sense that our reasons for
acting are ‘ours’.
As a reading of Hegel’s social and political theory, the notion of a
‘relational organism’ – as opposed to a ‘holistic organism’ – has the
resources to answer critics such as Berlin, Popper and others.15 Yet it
would seem inadequate simply to state that the relations that exist
within such an ‘organic’ social form are non-dominating relations of
mutuality and reciprocity. Such locutions are too vague. In order to
defend this notion of a relational organism, the notion of ‘relation’
must be given stronger theoretical content. In this paper, this notion
will be filled out by reference to recognition theory. It will be argued
that the reciprocal relations within the organic society offered by
Hegel are, in fact, recognitive relations. By connecting the notion of
recognition theory to the notion of relational organism, I make a
contribution to understanding the structure of Hegelian Geist. In
                                                           
15 Quadrio, op cit, 15-38.
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previous papers, I have focused on the emergence of Geist,16 giving a
non-metaphysical reading which can be summed up, borrowing a
phrase from the great American Hegel scholar Robert Williams, by
saying that recognition is the ‘existential phenomenological genesis’17
of Geist . Geist has an intersubjective genesis, emerging from a
moment of recognition that passes between two mutually or
reciprocally recognising subjects. Yet, as any undergraduate students
of Hegel will tell us, Hegelian Geist manifests at three different
levels: as Subjective Geist, as Objective Geist and as Absolute Geist.
Hence any insights drawn about the nature of Geist from this
intersection of recognition theory and organic theory must also
address the ‘Subjective’ and ‘Absolute’ dimensions of Hegelian
Geist . My focus will remain predominantly on the social or
‘Objective’ level but, towards the end of the paper, I articulate how
this position impacts on Subjective and Absolute Geist. The results of
this analysis are therefore important for Hegel studies, for socio-
political theory and for the philosophy of culture generally.
The Recognitive Nature of the ‘We’
The next task then is to turn to the subject of Anerkennung or, as it is
referred to in English, recognition theory. It would be impossible to
give a complete account of that theory here. Commentators such as
Williams, L Seip, J Habermas and A Hönneth (to name a few)
provide this. I will introduce features of it that are important in my
later argument. If we accept that Hegel’s political theory presents a
relational organicism in which there is a reciprocal or mutual relation
between the elements, and between the elements and the whole,
something more must be said about the nature of the relations that
exist. Recognition theory can be used to fill out the relational theory
and provide a more detailed account of the type of relations found in
the organic society. As we shall see, the recognitive relation is one
whereby the relata are mutually penetrating, reciprocally informing
                                                           
16 P A Quadrio, ‘Geist and Normativity in Hegel’s Early Theological Writings’ in F
Di Lauro, ed, Through a Glass Darkly: Reflections on the Sacred (Sydney, 2006) 95-
112.
17 Williams, op cit, 91.
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and transforming. It is a union which preserves the freedom or
independence of the elements united by releasing each element to
make its own particular contribution to the relation. This relation
cannot adequately be thought, either purely in terms of an
aggregation of the parts or purely in terms of the whole, since it is a
relation which expands or enriches each of the elements involved by
bringing them into relation. Organicism can thus be thought of as the
complement of recognition theory, in that it provides an account of
the structure and nature of the phenomenon of recognition from a
social-theoretic perspective. This claim needs to be developed, but
before anything can be said in this regard, we need an account of the
recognitive relation.
Recognition theory has a very broad scope and so, in giving an
account of that theory, it is best to begin with a fairly broad view.
One can start by viewing it as a response to a Kantian paradox about
the relation of freedom and human agency. The paradox is nicely
stated by Pinkard: ‘…we seem to be both required not to have an
antecedent reason for the legislation of any basic maxim [as that
reason would then determine our action] and to have such a reason
[otherwise our actions are arbitrary and hence non-agential]’.18 In
order to consider myself free and self-determining, I must be able to
legislate the maxim or rule that underwrites my action. I must have a
reason for acting, since otherwise it seems that I am not an agent in
the true sense of the word. But if that reason is given to me from the
outside, as it were, then my reason for acting would not be self-
determined; I would be determined by factors external to me. On the
other hand, if such a maxim or rule could be generated by pure reason
unaided by anything external to it, then for Kant, it ought to be
something that any rational agent could affirm. Yet since it was
generated by pure reason, it is a rule that the subject applies to itself.
In determining myself according to such a rule, I am not only a self-
determining being, but a being that has determined itself by rules that
are universally valid, valid for all rational subjects. The rule would be
universal, but still be spontaneously generated by the subject. Pinkard
                                                           
18 T Pinkard, German Philosophy: 1760-1860 The Legacy of Idealism (Cambridge,
2002) 226.
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points out that, for Kant, such rules would be the product of a
universal self-consciousness,19 a norm that ‘we’ all could find
rationally binding, a norm that we could all share qua rational
subjects. To flag the problem that I will deal with in detail, it would
seem that, if I am to generate universal rules or maxims without
referring to anything external to subjectivity, then I seem to be left
with few resources for generating such rules or maxims. This
problem was recognised by Kant’s peers and was a fundamental
problem for those who came after Kant.
From the post-Kantian perspective, the problem is that the isolated
rational subject – operating on the basis of pure reason20 and
completely unaided by any prior dependencies, social or natural21 –
does not have the resources to generate or legislate such a maxim or
rule.22 How does one issue a law to oneself that one could see as
binding, through which one could regulate one’s conduct? This
cannot be done in Kantian terms. It cannot be done from the point of
view of an atomistic isolated subjectivity. If this question is to be
answered, the Kantian perspective needs to be reorientated:23 the
subject must have a relation to actuality; it must have some relation to
something beyond itself; it cannot be free from all dependencies. The
question then becomes: what is the authority that determines whether
these rules or maxims are adequate to the perspective of universal
self-consciousness?24 The concern is that the Kantian account places
so much emphasis on the rationality or universality of the form of the
maxims by which we act, and so little on the content, that any
determinate content or maxim might be twisted so as to have the
appearance of universal validity. Thus Hegel will claim ‘just as
                                                           
19 Ibid, 225.
20 Reason unaided by reference to empirical experience.
21 R Pippin, ‘What is the Question for which Hegel’s Theory of Recognition is the
Answer?’, European Journal of Philosophy 8:2, 2000, 157.
22 While I think Kant can be saved from this ‘emptiness’ charge, I will not pursue
that argument here. It is sufficient to say that, from the post-Kantian perspective,
pure reason seems lacking in the resources to determine adequately any specific
action.
23 Pinkard, op cit, 227.
24 Ibid, 225.
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subjectivity evaporates every content into itself, it may also in turn
develop it out of itself’25 – arbitrarily, it would seem.
Certainly it would be problematic to assume that the isolated
atomistic subject has the capacity to determine whether the maxims
or rules for action at which it arrives through the process of reflection
were universally binding or not. In that case, we run the risk of
mistaking the parochial perspective for a universal one. As Hegel
suggests, ‘self-consciousness is capable of making into its principle
either the universal in and for itself, or the arbitrariness of its own
particularity’.26 From the Hegelian perspective, the Kantian subject
has nothing against which its maxim can be tested apart from the
criterion of formality. Because almost anything could be rendered
formally valid, this is an inadequate criterion. Both of these claims –
that the Kantian isolated subject lacks the resources to generate any
determinate maxim and that the subject could twist the maxims into
universal form – make the Kantian account problematic for many
post-Kantian thinkers. But the crucial question here remains the
broadly Kantian one about the nature and possibility of autonomous
agency: in what sense can we take ourselves to be self-determining
beings?27 Thus, Robert Pippin points out that the question of
recognition is, at least in part, ‘the question of the nature and the very
possibility of freedom’.28
The answer to this question is recognition, a process that brings one
into ‘the right relation to [one’s] own deeds,’ such that I experience
those deeds as being mine.29 This requires a reorientation. The
isolated subject of pure reason – the Kantian rational subject – has, on
                                                           
25 G W F Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (Cambridge, 1998) §138,
Addition (H), 166.
26 Ibid, §139, 167, emphasis Hegel’s. For German equivalent see K Ilting, Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie 1818-1831: Die
‘Rechtsphilosophie von 1820 (Stuttgart, 1974) 492.
27 Pinkard, op cit, 226.
28 Pippin, op cit, 155.
29 Ibid, 157.
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the post-Kantian reading,30 no resources to generate binding maxims
that are applicable to concrete situations and so must refer to
something other than pure reason.31 There must be a reference to
something outside of Kantian reason; the subject must be in a relation
to some kind of actuality that could underwrite what is legislated. The
actions of an agent, if not arbitrary or lawless (and hence not free),
must have their basis in a reason: there must be a reason for acting
‘thus’.32 Rather than set, as a condition of freedom, the requirement
that the action not be based on anything external to pure reason, it is
better to look to the quality of the reason on which the agent acts to
see whether its determination is free.33 Thus, the competence of the
agent to articulate good reasons for acting in precisely the manner it
does determines the extent to which it can see the action as stemming
from its own activity and the extent to which it can see the action as
free.34 Again, the problem arises: how can the subject determine the
strength or quality of its reason for acting?
The idea is that a good reason or maxim is one that other rational
agents can affirm. The subject is still looking for a perspective that
might be described as a universal self-consciousness: what other
rational selves would do. This gives the subject some security about
what it ought to do. What we can mutually affirm can be thought of
as a perspective that we share, that is internal to us. What we affirm
we ought to do. We have invoked the perspective of other rational
                                                           
30 Kant may be saved from this post-Kantian critique. While this is not possible to do
so here, Hegel’s point is a generally accepted one. No matter how one might want to
nuance Kant’s argument to save him from this critique, the problem challenges those
who inherit the Kantian tradition. If grappling with the problem generates useful
theoretical resources, we ought consider the way post-Kantian thinkers have dealt
with it.
31 Here it is also important to note that, while the Kantian conception of rationality is
a significant departure and critique of the kind of instrumental conception of
rationality that animated mainstream Enlightenment accounts of reason, post-Kantian
thinkers further reorient the Kantian approach. For a more complete account of this
transformation in the notion of rationality, see PA Quadrio, ‘Art and Politics in the
Systemprogramme’, 142-165
32 Pippin, op cit, p. 159.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
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agents, other like-constituted beings, and it would seem unfair for the
agent to say, ‘let my judgment stand in for the judgment of all
rational agents’, because that runs the risk that the parochial
individual will is mistaken for, or elevated to, the status of a single
universal will. If the agent claims it to be rational, the action invokes
the authority of others whom I recognise as having authority to judge,
as able to see the action as the result of good reasons and to view the
agent as someone who has the ability to act from reasons. In other
words, in order mutually to recognise a reason as binding or
authoritative, we must first mutually recognise each other. The
recognition of the authoritative nature of a reason, that is, the
constitution of a norm, is thus based in the recognitive act of our
mutually according each other worth. Thus, as Pinkard claims:
‘[s]ince the agent cannot secure any bindingness for the principle
simply on his own, he requires the recognition of another agent of it
as binding on both of them. Each demands recognition from the other
that the ‘law’ [or maxim] he enacts is authoritative (that is, right)’.35
Insofar as the other agent does recognise my reason for acting as
being good, that reason becomes authoritative. It becomes normative;
it is something ‘we’ have seen as right or good. Thus the normative is
based in a reciprocal intersubjective relation, the mutual affirmation
that is the basis of the ‘we’.
The maxim or rule becomes ‘our’ maxim or rule, the way ‘we’ go
about addressing this situation. It is not generated out of parochialism
but through a universal perspective that is achievable only with
another or others who affirm the rationality of the maxim. It is a
perspective generated through mutual and reciprocal recognition. In
this recognition of the other as like myself, I expand my perspective
on the action to include their perspective. I recognise that they have a
perspective on my actions and that their being rational means they
have the authority to judge the rationality of my actions. But, if they
are judging my action as an action, that is, something other than an
event that takes place through natural necessity, then they are already
viewing me as an agent, as one who determines their actions through
reason, as a rational being like them with a perspective and an
                                                           
35 Pinkard, op cit, 227.
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authority to judge the rationality of actions. Thus, through
recognition, the universal perspective opens up: a universal self-
consciousness. We see ourselves as ‘like’ each other in that we act for
reasons.36 We also realise that the binding nature of our reasons for
action requires some kind of affirmation from a perspective other
than our own. It requires the other. Norms are then the result of a
social transaction that requires a universal self-consciousness, a ‘we’
or Geist. In that we can both affirm the rationality of those reasons,
they become ‘our’ reasons. The ‘we’ takes on the possessive form
and ‘our’ reason becomes the way we go about judging or acting. But
if norms issue from Geist, in that Hegel identifies reason itself with
Geist,37 and if the ‘existential phenomenological genesis’38 of Geist is,
as per Williams, the act of mutual and reciprocal recognition, then
one is led to conclude that the existential genesis of Geist, the
existential genesis of reason itself, is an intersubjective relation that
has an organic, reciprocal structure.39 Freedom, the capacity for self-
determination through reasons or norms that I find authoritative, is, as
such, an intersubjectively mediated phenomenon, a Spiritual
phenomenon in the Hegelian sense that requires the organic mutuality
and reciprocity of the recognitive relation.
Williams and the Four Dimensions of Recognition
The above account might suggest that we enter into recognitive
relations for instrumental reasons, so that we can ensure that our
reasons for acting are binding ones. But to leave it there
misrepresents recognition theory. I will turn now to the work of
Robert Williams, so as to add an ethical dimension to the above
discussion. Drawing on Hegel’s Encyclopaedia and from the
                                                           
36 This is not, however, a reduction of the other to the same. This is dealt with
comprehensively in Williams, op cit, 53-59, 70-77 and 88-91.
37 Ibid, 91
38 Ibid.
39 For an interesting discussion that draws out the reciprocal nature of Hegelian Geist
so as to emphasise the reciprocity between elements bound up in a Spiritual relation,
see R Brandom, ‘Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel’s Idealism: Negotiation and
Administration in Hegel’s Account of the Structure and Content of Conceptual
Norms’, European Journal of Philosophy 7:2, 1999, 164-189.
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foundational work of Ludwig Siep, whose account of recognition
served as an impetus for much of the contemporary discussion,
Williams identifies four dimensions of recognition40 which reinforce
the connection between freedom and reciprocal recognition, as
presented above, but from a different perspective. His perspective
both deepens the positive or ethical side of the theory, orientating us
to its qualitative dimensions. This provides an indication of what the
recognitive relation is like, deepening the phenomenology of
recognition by breaking the phenomena down into discrete moments.
Understanding these dimensions provides a way of assessing the
adequacy of a recognitive relation, since each dimension must be paid
its due if that relation is to be adequate.
Siep’s work was foundational for recognition theory, his
Anerkennung als Prinzip der praktische Philosophie41 of 1978
essentially initiating the contemporary interest in that theory. In what
follows, Williams applies the theory to Siep’s account of Hegel’s
concept of freedom, which does not explicitly address the issue of
recognition.42 Within the context of a discussion of recognition,
however, Williams’ adaptation is in keeping with the spirit of Siep’s
work: they both hold that freedom is an intersubjectively mediated
social accomplishment.43 There are four distinct but interrelated
dimensions that emerge from an understanding of Hegelian
recognition theory: autonomy, union, self-overcoming and release
(freigabe).44 Each will be considered in turn.
1. Autonomy: this is linked with a release from natural causation,
which points to a conception of the will as capable of self-
determination, and hence, in principle, free from heteronomous
causation, from external determination.45 This is ‘in principle’
because, in saying that there is a release from natural or
                                                           
40 Williams, op cit, 80.
41 L Siep, Anerkennung als Prinzip der praktische Philosophie: Untersuchungen zu
Hegels Jenaer Philosophie des Geistes (Freiburg, 1979).
42 Williams, op cit, 80.
43 Ibid, 80-1.
44 Ibid, 80.
45 Ibid.
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heteronomous causation, it is not claimed that the will transcends
nature in a dualistic or supernaturalist sense. The will, qua activity, is
in a sense natural, just as we might say that other modes of human
activity – walking for instance – are natural. In linking autonomy to a
release from natural causation, we are saying that the will is not, to
borrow from Pippin, ‘pushed and pulled by contingent desires and
external pressure’.46 Autonomy is a capacity for self-determination,
although one that is not necessarily exercised. It has two moments: a
negative one, whereby human volition can negate external
determination or hold off from falling into any determinate shape,
and a positive one, whereby human volition can actively take up a
specific determination and allow itself to take on some determinate
shape. The autonomous will is not, however, caught in a tension
between the negative and the positive. These are two sides of the
same coin. In order actively to take up a specific determination as
mine, that is, something I have actively and rationally chosen
(positive moment), I must, prior to that determination, be able to hold
back from passively falling into any specific determination (negative
moment). It is only when the two moments are brought together that
autonomy, as self-determination, is achieved. Finally, despite Hegel’s
belief that autonomy is a social achievement, something that has
determinate social conditions that facilitate individual autonomy,
there is a sense in which this dimension seems to have an egocentric
orientation. This point aside, the qualitative importance of autonomy
is that, if the recognitive relation is to be stable, it must be
spontaneous and autonomous and not the result of external coercion.47
For Hegel this is primarily because coercion negates freedom,48 so
that the relation achieved would not be enduring, but contingent, and
would evaporate were the coercive threat removed.
2. Union/Association: to be in union in this sense is to be in relation
with an ‘other’ where that other is not felt to be a limit to the self.49
This does not imply the effacement of individuality, for difference
                                                           
46 Pippin, op cit, 157.
47 Williams, op cit, 77-78.
48 Ibid, 160-161.
49 Ibid, 81.
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and limitation exist in union with the other, but are overcome and
viewed as part of the union itself, as moments of the union.50
Importantly, the German word Vereinigung, translated as ‘union’, can
also be translated as ‘association’, a rendering that captures the idea
that individuality is preserved in this union51 yet does not quite
capture the integral nature of the term. Since union here is a self-
constituting term, it is better to retain it, nuanced by the idea that the
union does not constitute a monolithic undifferentiated entity. The
union preserves the integrity of what is unified, but the unity itself
constitutes a new relation, a new universal in which what is unified
finds itself anew. Through this new relation, the elements unified can
come to more complex—expanded—understandings of themselves.
The relation is reciprocal and mutual. This notion of union can be
understood through the Hegelian concept of ‘Love’.52 Crudely, this is
a union in which conflict, opposition and estrangement are overcome,
while difference is preserved.53
Although Hegel’s account is complex, there is certainly a large
degree of resonance between the dimension of recognition and
freedom that we find in union and Hegel’s account of ‘Love’. In the
dialectical union of love, self-relation and other-relation are unified,
such that I come to myself more completely through my relation to
the other and vice-versa; the nodes are not external to each other but
each is internal to the other. This leads to one last point: through
union, the subject is decentred. The other must count and does so in
two ways: firstly, in being something like me to whom I ought to
accord the same respect that I demand; and secondly, in mediating
my sense of self through affirmation of my own worth. In the
dimension of union there is a very important moment that is
allocentric or other-centred, but which does not negate the subject. In
union there is an opening out to the other that is simultaneously a
return to the self, without which union cannot be achieved. Thus
                                                           
50 Ibid.
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52 I use the capital to warn the reader that this is a Hegelian term of art and cannot be
taken as an equivalent of the common usage of that term.
53 Williams, op cit, 81.
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union is truly intersubjective. It is no mere aggregation of objects that
are indifferent or external to each other, but is a union in which the
other counts for me and I count for the other. Each is, in this sense,
internal to the other.
It might seem as if the relation of union negatively impacts on
autonomy, because the relationship between the elements unified
seems to imply that they are mutually limiting. But this is not the
case, as both Siep and Williams understand. The human being is
always in relation. If autonomy could only be had by being free from
all relation to others, then autonomy itself would be a chimera.54 Once
this is understood, discussions of autonomy must work within the fact
of relation; we cannot be autonomous without relation because we
cannot ‘be’ without relation. I take it as relatively uncontroversial that
‘being’ is a minimal condition of autonomy.55 Yet, while there is no
necessary contradiction between autonomy and union, their relation
does, at first blush, appear paradoxical: they appear to pull in
opposing directions. Autonomy seems to pull us towards self – it
appears to be an egocentric movement – whereas union seems to pull
us towards other – it appears to be an allocentric movement. The
power of the theory of recognition is that it gives us a way to think
through this paradox by seeing these two dimensions as being
dialectically unified: autonomy requires relation, and relation, if it is
to avoid falling into monolithic indifference, requires autonomy.
3. Self-overcoming: this follows from union since, through the
relation to other, the self is expanded. Through its relation to the
other, the subject is decentred and overcomes its parochial
limitations. This decentring of the subject is a movement away from
‘I’ and towards the other. Most importantly, it is a movement towards
the ‘we’, an expansion of the subject in the direction of community.56
                                                           
54 Ibid, 81-2.
55 Being is a condition for autonomy in that autonomy implies self-governance, the
capacity for an agent to generate the rules by which they act, which itself implies
being. I say this only to guard against the interpretation of autonomy as ‘freedom’. If
we understand autonomy simply as freedom then we might be tempted, wrongly, to
think that non-being is autonomy.
56 Williams, op cit, 82-3.
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In opening out towards the other, I allow the other to count, seeing
their perspective as important. Thus I allow their perspective to
penetrate mine, to become internal to my own, enriching my
perspective. This is what is meant by self-overcoming: the self
overcomes its parochial limitations to expand in the direction of
community. Through the self-overcoming that constitutes the ‘we’,
the ‘I’ has a mode of self-relation. It can return to itself from a
universal perspective, the perspective of the determinate
intersubjectivity of the ‘we’57 that enriches the perspective of the ‘I’.
Thus the self-enrichment achieved through self-overcoming has
different dimensions: it allows the other’s perspective to count for me
and, in that it is reciprocal, it allows my perspective to count for the
other. It allows for mutuality of perspective; it allows for the ‘we’. So
again, there is a tension between two moments – one subject-
orientated and one other-orientated. This is not an actual tension
since, in that the two moments are dialectically unified in the ‘we’,
they are two aspects of something unified, two faces of a single coin.
4. Release (Freigabe): there are two moments within this dimension
of freedom and recognition: one negative and the other positive.58 The
negative moment is a renunciation or negation of any authoritative or
paternalistic relation to the other. It is the negation of the pursuit of
control.59 The positive moment is the affirmation of the other as other
in all its particularity, the affirmation of the other in their difference.60
Taking these two moments of release together, we can describe this
dimension as one whereby we give expression to our realisation that
the other is an end in itself, a being who is rational61 and capable of
setting its own ends, who demands my respect and whom I ought not
try to control. Release affirms that the other counts, that their
                                                           
57 Ibid, 83.
58 Ibid, 84.
59 Ibid.
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61 Here rationality is taken in a minimal sense as simply the capacity to marshal
‘reasons’ which justify or support our actions, beliefs and attitudes; it concerns our
capacity to give an account of ourselves. Thus a rational agent is one with whom I
could engage discursively about their actions, beliefs and attitudes and who could
engage me about mine.
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perspective and contributions are valid. Williams tells us that this
dimension of release is the consummation of reciprocal recognition
and the birthplace of Spirit or Geist. It is a community of freedom
that does not absorb or reduce individuals to a homogenous mass. It
is not holistic, but rather presupposes, requires, accepts and preserves
differences.62 This release of the other is not an indifference to the
other, but a being at home with the other in all their difference.63
Again, the two moments of release seem to pull in two different
directions: the release is a ‘giving of freedom to’ the other, but this
act of giving takes the form of a withdrawal from the other. It is not a
complete withdrawal, but recognition that the other is a capable and
autonomous being whom I ought to allow to go free, whom I ought to
trust to express their own autonomy. It is not a withdrawal from
relation but recognition of the dignity of the other, particularly the
rational dignity of the other.
Williams explains that for Siep there is a tension between the
dimension of self-overcoming and release.64 Williams rejects the
apparent tension, claiming that release is the external manifestation
and expression of the dimension of self-overcoming, of the fact that I
have overcome my parochial limits and expanded towards the other.
Together these two dimensions represent the overcoming of
egocentricism, the product of which is an opening towards the other
while letting it be.65 It is a recognition of the other as an end in itself,
an other that counts, towards whom I have responsibilities. For
Williams, these dimensions of freedom and recognition are not
contradictory; they are necessary and complementary moments.
Siep’s point should not be rejected, however, without noting that
there is at least an appearance of tension here: the two dimensions
appear to be moving in different directions. The moment of self-
overcoming is an expansive movement, out towards the other, an
allocentric movement, whereas the dimension of release is a return to
self and hence is egocentric. But, properly understood, there is no
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tension: the movement is dialectical, a self-overcoming. It is in fact
an opening out towards the other that simultaneously allows us to
step back from the other in non-interference. It is an opening out
towards the other in its difference. The paradox or tension between
these two moments only operates at the surface level. One of the
benefits of a theory of recognition is that it facilitates our thinking
through such tensions, thinking through the felt paradox. In the same
sense, the tension between the dimension of union and the dimension
of autonomy is not an actual tension but rather a movement towards
relation in which we are able to step more fully into ourselves. In my
view, these four moments constitute two complementary pairs; within
each pair, there is a seemingly paradoxical relation, for the two terms
seem to have opposing momentums.
For Williams the dimensions of self-overcoming and release also
reveal the nature of the dimension of union. This union does not
imply the subsumption of the elements unified into an
undifferentiated unity. The union preserves the particularity of the
elements unified66 in all their difference. In this kind of union, release
is mutual or reciprocal. Further, none of this is hostile to autonomy
since, while it may be intelligible or perhaps logically possible to
think of a human being free of all relation, it is relatively
uncontroversial that, despite this logical possibility, such a being is a
practical impossibility. No such being ever has or ever will exist.67 A
human being must, via practical if not logical necessity, be in some
kind of relation to an other, be it another subject or even simply a
relation to spatio-temporal objects. In what kind of relation to an
other could the human being be which is not hostile to its autonomy?
Such a union would have the features of self-overcoming, the
opening towards the other that expands and enriches the self, and also
of mutual release, whereby the other is allowed to be. It is a relation
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67 Indeed it might be suggested that relation is part of the very concept of the human
being and that, at a minimum, all human beings need: a) a context into which they
emerge, and b) some being from which they emerge (a mother). A concept of a
human being that does not implicitly or explicitly acknowledge these essential
relations seems to provide an insufficient analysis of what it is to be a human being.
We could say that the notion of an unrelated human being is unintelligible.
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whereby we affirm the other in their difference from ourselves. This
is the recognitive relation.
Thus the four dimensions of freedom and recognition harmonise. The
tensions between them are not hostile, but rather inform and fulfil
each other. Recognition is the self-constituting unity of an
intersubjective relation that enriches the relata by giving them a
universal frame of reference, a universal mode of self-relation and a
universal self-consciousness. This account brings out the ethical
nature of the recognitive relation. While it is clear that this kind of
intersubjective social relation is not the result of fear of violence, but
rather the result of an act on the part of the subject that has cognitive
and practical significance, neither is it the result of instrumental
reasoning. Rather it seems to be the result of a capacity to think
particularity under universals. It is the result of the subject’s capacity
to see the other as like oneself in a formal and abstract sense, without
negating their difference. It is to see ourselves as not merely two
juxtaposed particulars, an aggregation of objects that are indifferent
to each other, but as a community, having something common that
we can mutually affirm. Recognition provides an account of relation
where universal relation is based in something intersubjective.
This account of recognition theory provides a more concrete way of
understanding the notion of the relational organism. In particular it
gives us an account of the specific type of relation that we find in the
relational organism: it is a Spiritual or recognitive relation. The
relational organism is a self-constituting unity wherein the parts and
the whole, and the parts between themselves, are bound in mutual or
reciprocal relations. Each element could be informed by and
reciprocally inform, and be transformed by and reciprocally
transform, the perspective of every other element. Thus an element
cannot be viewed as parochial or isolated, for it is enriched by and
enriches the other. In the relational organism, each element
transcends its own parochial limitations, expanding its perspective in
such a way as to affirm the perspectives of others. It is a unity
wherein no element dominates others but rather releases the others to
make their own contribution to the unity according to their own
capacity for self-determination. It is a relation that affirms the other
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as co-constitutive of the self and affirms the self as the co-constitutive
of the other. The reason why the relational organism is characterised
by recognitive relations is that recognition itself has an organic
reciprocal structure. A theory of organic relations is the ontological
complement to the phenomenon of the recognitive relation. The
former describes the structure of the latter. Insofar as recognition
constitutes the ‘existential phenomenological genesis’68 of Geist, we
can say that Geist is born from the organic relation between mutually
recognising subjects. Further, since recognition constitutes, according
to Williams, the ‘substance of every essential Spirituality’,69 we are
also led to acknowledge that Geist itself has an organic structure. It
too is a self-constituting, non-dominating unity bound by mutual and
reciprocal recognition.
The Organic Nature of Geist
When it comes to considerations of Objective Geist, the claims of the
preceding section do not seem controversial. Williams’ work, Hegel’s
Ethics of Recognition,70 demonstrates the connection between
recognitive relations and the norms and practices of cultural and
institutional life. If it is true, as has been suggested, that organicism is
the ontological/structural complement of the phenomenon of mutual
recognition in the sphere of ‘Objective Geist’, and if it were true, as
Williams suggests, that recognition is the ‘existential
phenomenological genesis’71 of Geist, then the idea that Objective
Geist has an organic structure follows. Yet in order to support the
claim that Geist itself has an organic structure, some consideration
must be given to Subjective and Absolute Geist. Whilst a complete
substantiation of that claim is beyond the confines of this paper it
would be remiss not to indicate its general direction. I end the paper
by turning to a direct consideration of the organic nature of Hegelian
Geist.
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Before considering Objective, Subjective and Absolute Geist, it is
worth pausing to consider the way the contemporary Hegel specialists
understand Geist in general. In his account of the nature of Geist,
Stephen Houlgate makes the following claim: ‘[S]pirit, is self-
conscious reason that relates to an other, whom it recognises also to
be self-conscious reason, and who recognises the first in turn as such
reason. Spirit, therefore, takes the form of a community of reciprocal
recognition’.72 Here the term ‘recognition’ helps to give
phenomenological content to a reciprocal, co-constituting, organic
structure. This structure is one wherein the elements are mutually
determining or co-constituting; Houlgate’s citations of Hegel identify
the way the elements within this community of reciprocal recognition
gain their self-certainty through their relation to the other elements.73
It is particularly significant that this structure is a community, taken
in the everyday sense as implying a social group unified by
something common or, in the less everyday and more abstract sense
as a collection of interdependent elements.74 Houlgate’s comments
are meant as an abstract account of Geis t ,75 so the latter
understanding of community is perhaps the more appropriate. Thus,
we are led to the idea that Spirit is a collection of interdependent
elements, bound up in relations of mutual and reciprocal
determination and constitution. The elements interpenetrate and are
mutually informing and transforming, and, furthermore, the
phenomenological character of such relations is recognitive. With this
understanding, we can now turn to consider the way that the
recognitive relation is expressed in Objective, Subjective and
Absolute Geist.
Objective Geist relates to the norms and practices of our customary
and institutional life, that is, the norms, practices and customs, written
and unwritten, that animate the movement of human social life. If
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considered as a unity, it is the self-constituting unity76 of our
customary and institutional life. Clearly the elements within this unity
are not mutually recognising per se, but it is also clear that they are
not merely a collection of isolated elements aggregated together. The
elements within that unity are in fact mutually conditioning, mutually
informing and transforming. Consider the specific norms related to
setting a dining table and the way that these norms are orientated by
broader and more general social norms, norms which are themselves
given content by such specific practices as table setting. Or consider
the way road rules express our broader norms and values whilst
simultaneously orientating our specific practice of driving according
to those broad norms. We could also consider that subset of social
conventions or norms known as language. What would it be for such
a set of norms to be mutually informing and transforming? It would
simply mean that each element becomes something determinate only
in its relation to the other elements of that set, elements which it in
turn and reciprocally helps to make determinate. The norms and
institutions of our customary and institutional life are not indifferent
to each other; they are not isolated elements, but they are mutually
and reciprocally conditioning, elements that always point beyond
themselves.
Subjective Geist can be thought along similar lines. If Subjective
Geist, or individual psychological or mental life, is considered as a
unity that has an organic structure, then the various elements of such
a unity are bound in relations that are mutual and reciprocal. In
particular, the elements within that unity have a mutual or reciprocal
co-constituting relationship with one another. If the elements of
individual mental life display this organic structure, then we could
substantiate our claim in this regard. But what would it mean for the
elements of individual mental life to have such a structure? It would
mean that the elements of human mental life are not indifferent to one
another in a causal sense. If the human being learns something new,
or undergoes a certain experience or is affected by a certain mood,
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this will ramify through their mental life to a greater or lesser degree.
My thought or belief that ‘today it is hot and dry’ and my thought or
belief that ‘today is Friday’ are not thoughts that are indifferent to
each other, even if they are abstractly separable. This might be
confirmed by asking me what the weather was like on Friday, to
which I reply ‘hot and dry’. My mental life is not simply an aggregate
of discrete or atomic parcels that exist alongside whilst being
indifferent to one another; rather it is a unity of interpenetrating and
co-constituting elements. These elements of my mental life are not
necessarily mutually recognising elements, for that would be to
anthropomorphise them, but, in that the relation between the elements
is one of reciprocal or mutual determination, it evidences the same
structural features as are found in the recognitive relation: organic
structures.
Absolute Geist can be described as Geist’s or reason’s own self-
consciousness, of which we can identify three different
manifestations: art, religion and philosophy. Each of these is a
different mode through which reason can become conscious of itself
– in which case we can say that the whole – or better, the unity – to
which Absolute Geist refers, is the unity of self-conscious reason.
Restricting ourselves to that manifestation of Absolute Geist that we
refer to as philosophy, we can say that philosophy is the medium in
which reason can know itself as such and, most importantly, the
medium through which reason can come to consciousness of the
necessity that lies within its own self-actualisation in history, the
historical necessity of what is. Thus in understanding the history of
philosophy as the unfolding or self-actualisation of reason’s own self-
consciousness, we can understand the relation between elements of
this process as an organic relation. In his article, ‘Some Pragmatist
Themes in Hegel’s Idealism’,77 Robert Brandom provides important
clues as to how we might understand this process as occurring across
history. He talks in terms of recognition, but it is easy to see the
organic structure within his discussion. Brandom’s example relates to
the decision of judges in regards to common law:
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Past applications of concepts (decisions of cases) exercise an
authority over future ones. For they supply the precedents that
constitute the only rationales available to justify future decisions.
They are the source of the content of the concepts later judges are
charged with applying … But reciprocally, later applications of
concepts by judges who inherit the tradition exercise an authority
over the earlier ones. For the significance of the authority of the
tradition, what conceptual content exactly it is taken to have
instituted, is decided by the judges currently making decisions …
What the norm really is (what it is in itself) is the product of the
recognitive negotiation between these two poles of reciprocal
authority (what the content is for the past judges and what it is for the
present one) … The current judge administers the norms instituted
and determined by past applications. But who is there to hold the
current judge responsible to the tradition of prior applications, to
assess the fidelity of her decision to the content actually conferred on
the legal concepts by the tradition she inherits? ... The current judge is
held to accountable to the tradition she inherits by the judges yet to
come.78
This analysis gives us a way of understanding the institution and
administration of norms across time as the negotiation between
temporal poles of reciprocal authority. The norm penetrates and is
penetrated by past and future applications and understandings of it.
This provides us a way of understanding the history of philosophy
which, according to Hegel, is the history of reason coming to full
self-knowledge, a process of reciprocal, interpenetrating, negotiations
or relations across time. Descartes does not fall out of the sky fully
formed; his thoughts are shaped by philosophers of the past, whose
thoughts he in turn shapes in his very interpretation of them. Of
course he is not the final authority on the meaning of the tradition that
precedes him; we have some authority here too. But note that our way
of understanding the past, whilst it might reject Descartes’ own
understanding of that past, is an understanding that has itself been
shaped by Descartes’ understanding and which in turn shapes the way
that future thinkers will understand him. There is an organic relation
between the nodes; they are mutually informing and transforming.
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Conclusion
Thus we can see that, whether it is expressed in the individual mental
life of a subject, in the social rationality of a community or ultimately
in that community’s highest modes of self-relation (religion, art and
philosophy), Hegelian Geist has an organic structure. That organic
structure is a relational rather than a holistic organicism, wherein both
the whole and the parts, and the parts amongst themselves, are bound
up in relations that are mutually and reciprocally conditioning and
determining. Those working on Hegel’s social theory have given an
account of such relations in terms of recognition theory and have not
attempted to connect that theory to Hegel’s organicism. In this paper,
we have seen that the relational organicism that we find in Hegel’s
social theory is animated by a specifically recognitive relationship,
giving the organic structure a phenomenal form. Hegel’s social and
political theory, which is the core of his philosophy of Objective
Geist, presents us with a relational organicism: the structure of
Objective Geist is organic. We may extend this account beyond the
sphere of Objective Geist to feed into an account of Geist in general.
Geist is constituted by relations of reciprocity and mutuality wherein
its elements become mutually or reciprocally constituting or
determining. Thus, while for the sake of an understanding of Hegel’s
social and political theory, we can say that the relations that can be
found in the relational organic society are recognitive relations, we
can also say that these relations are truly ‘Spiritual’ relations in the
Hegelian sense: they are relations that evidence the organic structure
that is displayed at all levels of Geist. They are dynamic relations of
mutual or reciprocal determination.

